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Abstract
Climate change policy is a key example for globalized multi-level governance, involving the European Parliament (EP) both
as legislator of internal European Union (EU) regulation and discursive agent in global climate negotiations. Based on the
comparison of decision-making in external and internal climate change policy, the article investigates the link between the
role of the EP as a political actor and arena for the interaction of competing party groups: Does EP involvement in negotia-
tions on legally binding legislation prompt or constrain partisan polarization in comparison to declaratory statements about
future goals of climate action? Harnessing a discursive institutionalist theoretical framework, the article compares EP reso-
lutions about annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs 20 to 24) with the revision of four legislative acts for Phase IV of EU
Climate Action: namely, emissions trading, effort sharing between Member States, the promotion of renewable energies,
and energy efficiency standards. Using roll-call voting data and the review of legislative documentation, the contribution
tracks the emergence and negotiation of political conflict in these two sets of cases. Overall, the case studies indicate a
low level of external politicization, as indicated by low party group polarization, internalization of political conflict at the
committee level, and compromise-building between issue dimensions.
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1. The EP in Climate Policy: Legislative Politics Meets
Global Multi-Level Governance
Dealing with the problem of climate change is a highly
political question, raising strongly contested normative
questions concerning the ethical foundations of eco-
nomic and social order, concepts of justice and equity,
and how societies confront questions of risk and un-
certainty (Dryzek, Norgaard, & Schlosberg, 2013; Hulme,
2009; O’Brien, Lera St. Clair, & Kristoffersen, 2010;
Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014). In this sense, climate change
is a key field for research on the politicization of global
governance, including the role of legislative institutions.
As a task for empirical research, however, a major
challenge for mapping and explaining the political con-
testation of climate change governance consists of its
highly decentralized and multi-level structure: decision-
making about instruments for mitigating the causes of
climate change is not confined to a clearly defined set
of democratic institutions within one particular polity.
Instead, it evolves within a framework of agreements
on the global level, regional policy-making frameworks
such as the European Union (EU) as well as national
and sub-national constituencies, establishing an ideal-
typical case of globalized multi-level (or ‘polycentric’)
governance (Gupta, 2014; Jordan, Huitema, van Asselt,
& Forster, 2018; Ostrom, 2012; Zürn, 2012).
Against this background, a key puzzle for research
about parliamentary institutions in climate governance is
their dual role as an actor and arena in a multi-level con-
text: legislative institutions such as the EP combine a role
as an arena for the interaction of competing party groups
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in legislative decision-making with their emergence as
a political actor towards other institutions and entities,
including at the international level. How are both di-
mensions linked? Or phrased more specifically, how is
decision-making of the EP as an actor of climate gover-
nance linked to polarization between its party groups,
and what variation do we observe in this regard within
different institutional context of EP action? Beyond the
specific case of climate governance, this question speaks
to key topics of research on the politicization of EU gov-
ernance, including the links between politics and policy,
the role of parliamentary institutions in the contestation
of supranational policy, and the party political dimension
of EU governance.
This set of questions and topics remains underre-
searched in the existing literature. So far, most contri-
butions on climate change governance in the EU con-
centrate on its policy dimension by investigating regu-
latory approaches and instruments as well as their im-
plementation (Boasson & Wettestad, 2013; Delbeke &
Vis, 2015; Dupont & Oberthür, 2015; Ellerman, 2010;
Jordan, Huitema, van Asselt, Rayner, & Berkhout, 2010;
Oberthür, Pallemaerts, & Roche Kelly, 2010). By compar-
ison, research is still in its early stages concerning the
politics dimension, concerning issues such as the fram-
ing of climate change in public discourse (Engesser &
Brüggemann, 2016), political leadership of EU institu-
tions and Member States and its contestation (Wurzel,
Connelly, & Liefferink, 2017), aswell as the party-political
dimension of climate governance (Carter, Ladrech, Little,
& Tsagkroni, 2018). This state of research stands in no-
table contrast to the literature on climate politics in the
US, which (somewhat unsurprisingly) includes a higher
number of studies on political conflict and polarization
on this issue (Atkinson, 2018; Karapin, 2016; Sussman &
Daynes, 2013). Comparative research on the politics of
climate change (cp. Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010), how-
ever, would obviously benefit very much from more in-
depth studies that include European cases.
Zooming in on the role of the European Parliament
(EP) in this context is interesting for two reasons. First,
the EP is generally recognized as an early and progres-
sive actor in the evolution of EU climate change policy
(Burns, 2012; Burns & Carter, 2010; Burns, Carter, Davies,
& Worsfold, 2013). However, recent assessments have
characterized it as a mostly symbolic leader with an am-
bitious stance in its non-binding declarations on the EU’s
external climate diplomacy but a much more restrained
and pragmatic involvement in internal climate change
legislation (Burns, 2017; Biedenkopf, 2015). Addressing
the goals of climate action at the global level, the EP
appears as much more ambitious and willing to diverge
from positions of other EU institutions than in internal
climate change legislation, such as emissions trading or
promotion of renewable energy. Second, this apparent
asymmetry between an ambitious declaratory role of
the EP and a cautious legislative one establishes an in-
teresting case for scrutinizing the interrelation between
institutional factors and political conflict between party
groups: Resolutions by the EP on global climate nego-
tiations (and hence, a crucial part of the EU’s exter-
nal policy) are generally own-initiative procedures (INI)
without formalized interactions with the Council and no
legally binding effect on forthcoming negotiations. By
contrast, EP decision-making on legislative policy-making
such as EU emissions trading or renewable energy leg-
islation (internal climate change policy) is conducted
through the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP). This
procedure establishes a more institutionalized environ-
ment for EP action, involving a formal legislative proposal
by the Commission, a sequence of formally prescribed in-
teractions with the Council and parliamentary decision-
making about a legally binding act of EU legislation.
Comparing decision-making on both dimensions
therefore appears as a promising case study to under-
stand the interrelation between different forms of par-
liamentary involvement in climate policy and political
conflict as expressed through polarization between EP
party groups. Beyond the specific case of climate change
policy, this question is also of interest for the broader
literature on the emerging role of the EP as an inter-
national actor: investigating the interrelation between
institutional context and party political conflict speaks
to contributions to the literature on the role of the EP
that have highlighted amoderating effect of its increased
institutional involvement on the stringency of EP de-
mands and party group conflict (or, put more simply,
an effect of ‘behaving responsibly’ due to anticipated ef-
fects of legally binding parliamentary decisions; cp. Ripoll
Servent, 2015; Trauner & Ripoll Servent, 2016). This dis-
cussion provides the point of departure for this article:
We investigate how the arena and actor function of the
EP in climate change policy relate to each other by ask-
ing how decision-making on acts of external and inter-
nal policy-making are related to political polarization be-
tween EP party groups. The article proceeds in three
steps: the next section lays out the theoretical frame-
work for our analysis, before the main part presents a
comparison of EP decision-making on external and inter-
nal aspects within Phase IV of EU Climate and Energy pol-
icy, covering the most recent elective period of the EP
from 2014 to 2019. The subsequent conclusion relates
the findings back to the main topic of politicization.
2. Theoretical Framework: The EP as an Actor and
Arena of Global Climate Governance
Politicization is broadly accepted in the EU research liter-
ature as a term for the emergence of salient and polar-
ized public controversy between political actors involved
in European policy-making (cp. De Wilde, Leupold, &
Schmidtke, 2016; Hutter, Grande, & Kriesi, 2016). In this
sense, most contributions to the literature on politiciza-
tion focus on mapping and explaining political contro-
versy at the level of public discourse, but usually leave
out the analysis of political conflict within or between
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EU institutions that does not address or reach a broader
public. In this sense, politicization should not be equated
with political conflict arising from questions of European
governance but is generally used as a term for the de-
gree to which political actors communicate it to external
actors and audiences.
The approach taken in this contribution relates to the
debate on politicization but adopts a more specific and
dynamic perspective. By focusing on the polarization be-
tween EP party groups on issues of climate change gov-
ernance as the dependent variable, we single out an im-
portant aspect of politicization without, however, con-
sidering the public salience and resonance of political
debates. Including these latter criteria would require a
comprehensive review of public controversy and media
coverage of climate governance in at least a selection of
EU Member States, beyond the scope of the present ar-
ticle. The question addressed here, by contrast, focuses
on the interrelation between the institutional context
of decision-making and political conflict between party
groups represented in the EP. The rationale of the article
is thus to contribute insights how two points of reference
of EP activity—namely, the public communication of po-
sitions on climate governance and policy influence on
specific legislation—drive disagreements between par-
liamentary party groups as a first stage of potential sub-
sequent, broader politicization in the public sphere of EU
Member States.
Asmentioned at the outset, this comparison is based
on the distinction between the different rules and proce-
dures applied to EP decision-making in external and inter-
nal climate change policy. Based on these different pro-
cedures, activity of the EP at both levels as such is not
in question: for the case studies selected here, EP resolu-
tions on the conventions of the global Conferences of the
Parties (COPs) follow their yearly schedule, while recent
legislative decision-making on internal legislation was
prompted through the forthcoming entry of the EU into
the next envisaged stage of its Energy and Climate Action
package (dubbed ‘Phase IV’ for the period 2021–2030).
In this sense, EP activity or decision-making as such does
not establish a puzzle for explanation but is mostly pre-
scribed by established trajectories, allowing our analysis
to focus on the content and political conflict dimension
of decision-making.
From this point of departure, we harness Discursive
Institutionalism (DI) to establish a theoretical framework
for our analysis of EP party group interactions in different
institutional contexts of EU climate change governance
(Schmidt, 2008, 2010). This approach is chosen for two
reasons: First, DI speaks to essential aspects of the politi-
cization debate by focusing on the dynamic and often
conflictual exchange of ideas between political agents
through political discourse, and theway these exchanges
are structured by institutional frameworks. Second, DI is
useful as a heuristic framework to relate two different
spheres of parliamentary activity addressed in this arti-
cle: namely, the public communication of political posi-
tions towards a general political public and other enti-
ties as captured by the concept of communicative dis-
course (CMD); and decision-making about specific acts of
legislation through parliamentary agents as captured by
the concept of coordinative discourse (CRD; cp. Schmidt,
2008, p. 305, 2010, p. 15). While these two systems of
discourse overlap in concrete empirical case studies, they
help to distinguish two sets of linkages between agency,
institutions and conflictual discourse (see Table 1):
(1) Incentives and rationales of discursive agency: By
addressing different audiences (namely, the gen-
eral public versus policy-making agents), both sys-
tems of discourse establish different rationales of
action for political agents. In the case of CMD, the
mobilization of political support through position-
taking on politically salient and polarized topics;
in the case of CRD, substantial policy influence
through the modification of legislation, indepen-
dently from its public perception or support;
(2) Forms of interaction between discursive agents:
While political conflict is present at both levels of
discourse, polarizing and adversarial interactions
are incentivized more strongly at the level of CMD,
where the rationale of mobilization recommends
agents to increase the visibility and distinctiveness
of their positions in relation to other public speak-
ers; by contrast, the rationale of policy influence at
the level of CRD sets incentives for agents to seek
ways of accommodating and negotiating compet-
ing positions and arguments;
(3) Discursive frames of reference: Both discourse sys-
tems establish different incentives for the way in
which political agents articulate and frame their
political positions, namely through the communi-
cation of more general, political and relatively sim-
ple positions and arguments to maximize public
resonance at the level of CMD; and in the form of
more specific, technical and more elaborate policy
proposals and suggestions for modification of spe-
cific regulatory approaches at the level of CRD;
(4) Institutional setting and procedures: Finally, the in-
teraction of political agents at the level of CRD is
highly structured according to clearly formalized,
sequential steps of decision-making as specified in
the legal requirements of EU legislative procedure.
By contrast, CMD is generally much less formal-
ized and can take place throughmore spontaneous
and less formalized appearances or speeches by
political actors; in the same vein, it does not in-
clude formally prescribed sequential steps of nego-
tiation but evolves through public statements that
are not necessarily tied to a specified procedure of
decision-making.
In summation, the concept of EU politicization as com-
monly used in the literature is virtually synomymouswith
a shift or expansion of political conflict from the sphere
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Table 1. Overview of assumptions on discursive agency at the level of policy negotiation and public communication, based
on DI.
Coordinative Discourse (CRD) Communicative Discourse (CMD)
Rationale of action Influence-seeking Support-seeking
(output dimension) (input dimension)
Mode of Interaction Negotiation Justification
(policy-makers) (speaker to audience)
Frame of reference Specific approaches and instruments of policy Broader ideas and paradigms of policy
Institutional context Conducive to cooperation Conducive to competition
(specialization, delegation, exclusion of public) (generalization, leadership, accountability)
Link to politicization Expansion indicates dynamic of relative Expansion indicates dynamic of relative
and political conflict de-politicization politicization
(or internalization of political conflict to (or externalization of political conflict to public
intra-institutional negotiation) justification and contestation)
of coordinative to CMD. However, the advantage of using
the present distinction of both levels, however, is to gain
insights about how far political conflict remains confined
within institutional settings and procedures of EU policy-
making (by being internalized within the legislative pro-
cess of EP decision-making), or if it is communicated to
the outside, indicating an externalization of political con-
flict beyond specific policy-making venues.
Turning to the empirical cases, neither of the
decision-making procedures of the EP discussed here can
be identified entirely with one of the types of discourse
distinguished through DI. However, we assume that EP
decisions in the realm of external climate governance
resonate more strongly with the logic of CMD (as pri-
marily declaratory decision-making acts), while legisla-
tive decision-making on internal climate change mitiga-
tion leans more clearly towards the sphere of CRD (as re-
sulting from policy-making negotiation with the Council).
Comparing both levels of decision-making, we can there-
fore provide insights to what degree public communi-
cation and policy-influence work as incentives for party
group polarization. Furthermore, by going into amore in-
depth analysis of decision-making in the plenary at the
committee level, the subsequent analysis will uncover in
how far political disagreement is internalized (i.e., solved
within non-public procedures of policy coordination) or
externalized (i.e., communicated to the public through
public votes and declarations).
To conclude the theoretical discussion, two assump-
tions about the general context of our case studies must
be added. First, we approach the parliamentary dimen-
sion of EU climate change policy (or more specifically,
its supranational aspect as represented by the EP) as a
less likely case of politicization in comparison to other
settings and arenas of climate change politics. Several in-
stitutional features of the EU suggest a generally low po-
tential for strongly polarized public contention: namely,
the absence of a prominent, electorally accountable dis-
cursive agent in charge of justifying EU climate action,
combined with the absence of a resonant public sphere
on a transnational European scale (or CMD in typical DI
terms); and the presence of a highly specialized, sequen-
tial process of decision-making with a prominent role
of legislative mediators (particularly main and shadow
rapporteurs) and informal negotiation in the framework
of trilogues between Commission, EP and the Council
at the level of legislative decision-making (or CRD in DI
terms). Second, political conflict on EU climate action is
limited from the outset through the fact that its gover-
nance framework is well-established with regard to its
main approaches and instruments (such as emission trad-
ing, effort-sharing, and regulation to set incentives for
sustainable energy production and consumption).We ex-
pect that this considerably limits the scope of political
controversy on EU Climate Action, particularly in compar-
ison to other legislatures struggling with climate-related
legislation such as US Congress (Karapin, 2016; Sussman
& Daynes, 2013). While not denying the substantial im-
pact of technical details of policy, we expect political con-
troversy to exclude fundamental debates on the reality
or severity of climate change, and to focus on the adjust-
ment of specific, existing regulatory instruments. These
factors suggest thatmore political resources are invested
into policy negotiation than public communication, and
that a dynamic of consensus-oriented negotiation out-
weighs public communication about general aims and
principles of climate change mitigation. We therefore ex-
pect to find more intensive party group interaction and
conflict within the intra-parliamentary level of policy ne-
gotiation over specific pieces of climate change legisla-
tion than over external declarations.
In summation, the subsequent empirical section in-
vestigates three main hypotheses on the involvement of
the EP in European climate change governance:
H1: The overall (external) politicization of EP decision-
making as expressed through party group disagree-
ment is relatively low, particularly by not endanger-
ing the overall consent of the EP to decisions tabled
in the plenary;
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H2: Political conflict between EP party groups is ex-
pressed more clearly in decisions about external EU
climate policy than on internal climate legislation, par-
ticulary through the closer proximity of the former to
the logic of CMD;
H3: Political conflict about climate change legislation
is ‘internalized’ in the EP, that is, expressed more
strongly at committee level than in the plenary and
accommodated through consensus-oriented negotia-
tion through CRD.
3. Case Studies: EP Decision-Making on Phase IV of EU
Climate Action
The subsequent empirical analysis focuses on key de-
cisions of the EP on external and internal climate
change policy during its most recent legislative period
(2014–2019). With regard to external climate diplomacy,
during this period the EP has adopted resolutions on the
annual COP, most importantly on COP 21 in Paris where
the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol was ne-
gotiated. As mentioned above, these resolutions were
adopted as INI in which the EP responds to a communi-
cation by the Commission but is not formally bound to
a specific legislative proposal (as in the case of the Paris
negotiations). In other cases, it adopted a resolution on
a topical subject based on a text proposed by its environ-
mental committee (EP Committee on the Environment,
Public Health and Food Safety [ENVI]) without a refer-
ence document tabled by the Commission (as is the case
in resolutions on COP 20 in Lima and COPs 22–24 in
Marrakesh, Bonn and Katowice; cp. EP, 2014, 2015, 2016,
2017, 2018). All resolutions are adopted without any for-
mal involvement of the Council and legally non-binding
on negotiating partners at the climate summits (both
Member States and the EU delegation). Therefore, these
resolutions can be reviewed as acts of decision-making
primarily aimed at CMD: an announcement and justifica-
tion of EP positions without direct effect on or involve-
ment in policy-making.
Within the internal dimension, four particularly rele-
vant legislative procedures conducted in the context of
the revision of EU Climate Action for its Phase IV are
selected for the analysis of this article: namely, the re-
vision of the Emission Trading System (ETS), the regula-
tion on effort-sharing of Member States for the reduc-
tion of carbon emissions, and the directives on the pro-
motion of renewable energies (supply-side), and on tar-
gets for energy efficiency (demand-side). All of these
legislative acts were negotiated using the OLP and re-
sulted in the adoption of texts agreed between Council
and EP after the first reading (including inter-institutional
negotiations or trilogue between Commission, Council
and EP in the case of the ETS, effort sharing and en-
ergy efficiency). With regard to the institutional frame-
work of EP involvement, they obviously differ from reso-
lutions on external climate diplomacy by starting off from
a formal legislative proposal by the Commission, involv-
ing several EP committees to submit a report for a first
vote in the plenary and subsequent negotiation with the
Council. Therefore, these procedures are better exam-
ples to understand CRD conducted by the EP, establishing
more stringent institutional constraints on themediation
between party group preferences to define an EP posi-
tion, and the projection of EP in its negotiations with the
Council. Considering this difference of institutional con-
text, party group interaction and EP decision-making is
discussed in the subsequent section.
3.1. EP Votes and Decision-Making: External and
Internal Dimension
In a first step, we map the decision-making behavior of
the eight officially recognized EP party groups as well as
non-affiliatedmembers in plenary votes of the EP, assess-
ing party group polarization as expressed by voting be-
havior of MEPs in a comparison of external and internal
EU climate change action. Roll-call voting data exists on
all legislative acts on internal climate policy and two reso-
lutions in the external dimension, relating to the COP 21
in Paris and the subsequent COP 22 in Marrakesh (with
the rest of resolutions being adoptedby a showof hands).
The radar plot below depicts an overview of party group
votes aggregated from this data, indicating the relative
amount of Yes votes in relation to all votes cast in the
plenary and specifying this ratio for decisions on external
and internal climate policy as well as all votes considered
in this analysis (see Figure 1). On the whole, 3,767 votes
cast by MEPs in the plenary are included for this analysis
(2,569 on the internal, 1,198 on the external dimension).
Two findings result from this overview. First, the plot-
ting of voting behavior confirms that EP decision-making
on climate policy is not intensely polarized but broadly
supported by four party groups (European People’s Party
[EPP], Socialists & Democrats [S&D], Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe [ALDE] and Greens), with
more critical positions expressed through No votes and
abstentions to some degree by European Conservatives
and Reformists [ECR] and European United Left–Nordic
Green Left [GUE/NGL] (with a 15.4% and 53.8% share
of No votes, respectively) and more decisively by the
more Eurosceptic groups Europe of Freedom and Direct
Democracy (EFDD) and Europe of Nations and Freedom
(ENF) (casting No votes in 72.4% and 77.8% of cases,
respectively). The dent in support by S&D, however, is
mostly due to an abstention covering 146 MEPs in the
vote on the effort-sharing regulation. Overall, the ratio
of Yes/No/Abstain votes on legislative decisions is highly
positive for the entire EP (70.3/17.3/12.3). Concerning
polarization, the overall pattern of party group voting
can be characterized as corresponding to an Inverted U
pattern pittingmainstreamand environmentally progres-
sive groups against more Eurosceptic ones. Second, an-
other finding is that voting profiles do not significantly
differ between votes on legislation and non-binding res-






















Figure 1. Radar plot depicting party group voting on EU climate change policy. Notes: Survey of voting behavior by EP
party groups on legislative acts at the level of internal EU climate change policy (Legislative), and resolutions on external
EU climate change policy (Resolutions).
olutions: Resolutions on external climate policy, in this
sense, are notmore contentious decision-making acts for
the EP as decisions on internal legislation.
More specific insights on the dynamic of intra-
parliamentary decision-making—specifically, the rela-
tion between intra-parliamentary negotiation and EP
decision-making towards other EU institutions—are
gained from comparing voting results on committee re-
ports and subsequent votes in the plenary. The bar chart
below presents data on votes at both levels for inter-
nal climate change legislation and the one resolution on
external negotiations where data is available, based on
an overall count of 707 votes at committee level and
2,562 in the plenary for legislation and 251 in commit-
tee and 582 in the plenary for the COP 21 resolution
(see Figure 2).
The data confirms that political conflict is internalized
rather than externalized in EP decision-making about
climate change legislation. In all cases of legislative
decision-making on internal climate policy except one,
the approval rate to decisions is higher in the plenary
than at the committee level, suggesting that position dif-
ferences are fought out more intensely by policy experts
within the committees and approvedmore broadly in the
plenary.While this data provides some support to our hy-
pothesis that political conflict is internalized rather than
projected by the EP especially in internal climate policy,
it is not easily generalizable due to the low number of
cases. This recommends a more detailed in-depth quali-
tative review.
3.2. Qualitative Review: EP as an Agent and Arena of
Controversy on Climate Change Policy
Based on the review of legislative documentation (com-
mittee reports, resolutions adopted by plenary and
summaries provided by the European Parliamentary
Research Service [EPRS]), a qualitative reviewof decision-
making by the EP on Phase IV of EU Climate Action leads
two main observations. First, that the EP has generally
avoided a strategy of strong partisan politicization; and
second, that two distinct forms of involvement emerge
that put different emphases on the role of the EP as an
actor and arena of negotiation on EU climate action: on
the one hand, an emphasis on the communication of
strong and rather controversial policy preferences with-
outmuch internal coordination in external climate policy;
and on the other, an almost exclusive concentration on
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Figure 2. Decision making at committee level and in the plenary. Notes: Relative share of positive (Yes) votes on decisions
about EU Climate Change Policy at committee level and in the EP Plenary. Abbreviations refer to COP 21 Res = Resolution
on COP 21 in Paris; En Effcy=Directive on Energy Efficiency; Rnw eng=Directive on Renewable Energy; Eff Shrg=Directive
on Effort Sharing, and ETS = Emission Trading System.
internal policy coordination and negotiation with much
more restrained and consensual communication in in-
ternal climate policy. Three points are discussed subse-
quently to clarify this distinction.
First, clear differences emerge in a comparison of the
scope and intensity of intra-parliamentary policy coor-
dination at both levels. The number of committees in-
volved in the negotiation of reports tabled for the ple-
nary for first reading is lower in decision-making on res-
olutions about external climate policy: only the resolu-
tion on COP 21 in Paris and COP 20 in Lima involved
several EP committees (namely, three and five, respec-
tively), whereas the draft text for the subsequent reso-
lutions on COPs 22 through 24 were tabled only by the
responsible lead committee ENVI. By contrast, all leg-
islative decision-making procedures on the EU’s inter-
nal climate policy reviewed here involved two (Energy
Efficiency), five (Emission Trading), six (Effort Sharing)
and nine (Renewable Energies) committees drafting an
opinion on the report tabled in the plenary. The num-
ber of amendments tabled at committee level is also
higher in internal climate policy, where the amount
of amendments tabled ranges between at least 280 in
Effort-Sharing and 1,300 in Renewable Energies, as com-
pared to a range between 120 and 202 for those four
resolutions on external climate policy where an exact
count of amendments is available (excluding the resolu-
tion on COP 21 in Paris where at least 230 amendments
were tabled and one further report with amendments is
not available). CMD as conceptualized by DI, in short, is
‘thicker’ in internal legislation than in decision-making on
external climate policy.
Second, an important qualifying observation about
the way the EP negotiates political conflict in relation to
climate governance is that contention in this field can
hardly be reduced to a single dimension, in which dis-
agreements between party groups and EU institutions
could be easily mapped and compared as a measure
for politicization. As documented by the high number
of amendments tabled and negotiated at the committee
stage, decision-making evolves through a highly special-
ized and complex CRD between policy experts of the in-
volved EP committees and the Council. To systematize
this complexity, the distinction of three separate issue
dimensions—namelywithin a socio-economic, territorial
and institutional dimension (cp. Hix, Noury, & Roland,
2007)—helps to identify issue dimensions that are bal-
anced with each other to accommodate political conflict
between party groups. These issue dimensions can be
conceptualized and specified for the given case studies
as follows (see also Table 2):
(1) Regulation dimension: This dimension reflects
the overall stringency and ambition of action
taken to restrict carbon emissions as a cause
of climate change, either at the supply-side
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(Renewable Energies), or at the demand-side
(Energy Efficiency) of energy policy, and by estab-
lishing a framework for limiting and pricing those
emissions (Emissions Trading/Effort Sharing). As
a regulatory framework for economic investment,
production and consumption, this set of issues is
identified with the contrast between market free-
dom and regulatory intervention (‘left/right’);
(2) Intergovernmental dimension: A second dimen-
sion consists in the accommodation of asym-
metries resulting from distributive effects be-
tween different economic sectors and by exten-
sion, Member States with different constellations
of industries and geographical location. This as-
pect therefore resonates with the representation
of territorial interests represented mainly at the
intergovernmental level in the institutional frame-
work of the EU;
(3) Integration dimension: Finally, a third issue dimen-
sion arises from negotiating the degree of author-
ity of the supranational layer of rules and institu-
tions in the governance of climate change, partic-
ularly with regard to processes of implementation,
oversight and potential sanctioning, as well as the
allocation of financial resources to the discretion
of supranational institutions; this set of questions
therefore relates to a third dimension of political
conflict between national sovereignty and supra-
national integration.
Comparing EP decision-making in internal and external
climate policy within these issue dimensions reveals two
different patterns of political conflict: EP decision on ex-
ternal climate action are relatively antagonistic and em-
phasize the stringency of climate action over the other
dimensions. Internal legislation, by contrast, combines
moderate advances in the market regulation dimension
with concessions and flexibility in the territorial and au-
thority or institutional dimension.
Resolutions on the external climate policy of the EU
establish highly critical stances of the EP towards poli-
cies proposed by the Commission as well as the interna-
tional community and denoting considerable and quan-
tifiable position differences. Within these resolutions,
Table 2. Three issue dimensions in decision-making on Phase IV of EU Climate Action.
Market regulation dimension: Intergovernmental dimension: Integration dimension:
Stringency of climate action Asymmetries between Authority of EU policy
industries/Member States framework
Resolutions on • Appraisal of EU action in • Appraisal of Nationally • Appeals to partners on
external/global relation to 2C/1.5C goals Determined Contributions (NDCs) global scale, particularly US
action on climate • Balancing mitigation, by EU Member States • Shared EU position,
change adaptation and • Balancing efforts from inclusion of EP
compensation affected industries; LULUCF
(land use and forestry)
Revision of ETS • Linear Reduction factor • Provisions on carbon leakage • Inclusion of aviation and
(trading cap) (allocation of allowances) shipping
• Market Stabilization Reserve • Just Transition and • Allocation of funds from
• Balance between Modernisation Funds ETS revenues
auctioning/allocation
Effort Sharing • Reduction path to 2030 • Flexibility mechanisms • Monitoring and reporting
Regulation • Longer term perspective (banking, trading, transfer) cycles by Commission
to 2050 • Early action reserve for
Member States
Renewable • Target percentage of • Provisions on financial support • Inclusion of binding targets
Energies Renewable Energy Sources schemes in Member States or indicative national
Directive by 2030 • Provisions on permission of contributions
• Stringency of provisions cross border generation • Monitoring and reporting
on biofuels duties
• Extension to further
sectors (esp. transport)
Energy • Energy efficiency/ • Exemption and flexibility • Binding national energy
Efficiency consumption target clauses (sector exemptions) savings targets
Directive • Uniform or flexible • Review and revision
benchmark for clauses (evaluation by
measurement Commission)
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the EP criticizes both the international response to cli-
mate change but also the stance of the Commission,
whose communication is deemed ‘short-sighted and un-
ambitious on a number of levels, specifically as regards
the lack of national targets for renewable energy and
of any meaningful new action to incentivize energy effi-
ciency’ (EP, 2014, p. 11).With regard to substantive policy
goals, the most remarkable position expressed in the EP
resolutions is the call for more stringent policy goals, call-
ing for the inclusion of a 40% goal for the reduction of car-
bon emissions, of 40% for the improvement of energy ef-
ficiency, and of a 30% share of renewable energy sources
into the strategy for 2030 (compared to values of 40,
27, and 27 proposed by the Commission, respectively).
Beyond climate action by the EU, the EP expresses con-
cern that action pledged in NDCs under the Paris agree-
ment ‘does not bring the world even close to the 2C tar-
get’, pointing out that ‘that additional ambition is neces-
sary’ and calling for concerted action by the EU and other
major emitters to adjust their action plans (EP, 2016, p. 4).
Finally, another important aspect of EP resolutions is the
call formore determined financial action, requesting that
the EU and its Member States build on existing commit-
ments to bring their contributions to ‘their fair share in
the overall targeted amount of USD 100 billion a year by
2020’ to climate action (EP, 2015, p. 12).
Turning to legislation on internal climate policy,
much of the ambitious stance of the EP is softened con-
siderably, particularly with regard to the main target val-
ues for climate action. Furthermore, an important find-
ing is that the moderately progressive demands raised
by the EP in the socio-economic dimension are mostly
accommodated and balanced in the other dimensions,
defusing political conflict and helping to create broader
based coalitions supporting the passage of legislation.
3.2.1. Revision of the EU ETS
The revision of Emission Trading demonstrates the con-
struction of a compromise of positions within the three
dimensions outlined above, aiming at the general goal
of consolidating and strengthening emission trading. The
most high-profile issue of negotiations in this context is
the balance betweenmarket competition and public reg-
ulation concerning the limitation of emissions, particu-
larly through the definition of the linear reduction factor
for the emissions cap (hence, concerning the regulation
dimension). Concerning this question, the EP accepted to
maintain the 2.2% target as in the Commission proposal,
securing only an option of an increase to the 2.4% tar-
get it initially sought, along with the establishment of a
Market Stabilization Reserve to avoid an over-allocation
of allowances. Highly important for the achievement of
the political compromise achievedwith the Council, how-
ever, is the combination between an increase in the reg-
ulatory stringency of the supranational framework with
flexibility mechanisms and targeted recompensation for
vulnerable industries: in this sense, the EP achievedmore
stringent rules for the inclusion of aviation and ship-
ping, reviews of the ETS by the Commission and alloca-
tion of revenues to climate action (integration dimen-
sion), while providing exemptions for medium-sized en-
terprises, and supporting companies at risk of carbon
leakage with revenues from emissions trading. As a com-
pensation, the agreement increases resources for a ‘Just
Transition Fund’ to assist workers affected by the tran-
sition to climate-friendly technologies and providing a
Modernisation Fund for countries with a GDP below 60%
of the EU average, an aspect considered in the intergov-
ernmental dimension (cp. EPRS, 2018a).
3.2.2. Effort Sharing between EU Member States
A similar combination of progressive and accommodat-
ing positions in two different issue dimensions can be ob-
served in the revision of the Regulation on Effort Sharing,
the legal framework to establish reductions of carbon
emissions for each Member State for sectors not cov-
ered by the ETS. Here, the EP sought and achieved a
slightlymore stringent collective effort ofMember States
(regulation dimension). This point aims at establishing a
base reference and trajectory calculation that results in
a lower overall emission budget until 2030 than the one
proposed by the Commission, and establishing a long-
term linear trajectory for the longer-term period until
2050. These innovations, however, are compensated by
more generous flexibility mechanisms advocated by the
EP (affecting the intergovernmental dimension). Here
the EP pushed to increase the level of ‘borrowing’ for the
first implementation phase from 2021 to 2025 from 5%
as proposed by the Commission to 10%, and introducing
the right to transfer up to 10% to other Member States
in the subsequent phase from 2026 to 2030 (up from
5% in the Commission proposal). Furthermore, the EP
proposed an ‘early action reserve’, under whichMember
States with lower GDP are allowed to use emission cuts
made prior to 2020 in the implementation period from
2026 to 2030 (EPRS, 2018b). The integration dimension,
finally, is present mostly in provisions on monitoring cy-
cles and the stringency of reporting duties by Member
States to the Commission.
3.2.3. Renewable Energies
Within the comparison of cases presented here, the di-
rective on the promotion of renewable energies appears
as the initially most polarized example. Concerning the
overall stringency of action (regulation dimension), the
EP initially called for a target value of 35% until 2030
in first reading, as compared to 27% in the Commission
proposal and only 30% in a previous EP resolution. At
the same time, the EP also pushed for a lower thresh-
old for the share of newly created capacity open to
cross-border generation, hence limiting transnational ex-
changes of energy and increasing pressure on Member
States to achieve committed targets for renewable en-
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ergy (intergovernmental dimension). Along with stricter
provisions on biofuels (particularly the exclusion of bi-
oliquids produced from palm oil) and setting targets for
the transport sector to be realized by each individual
Member State, the EP established stringent positions
that were however softened in subsequent trilogue ne-
gotiations (cp. EPRS, 2019a). In the final agreement, the
binding EU target for renewable energies is set at 32%
and therefore at a higher level than in the initial proposal,
but to be achieved through indicative national contribu-
tions without the corrective measures initially pursued
by the EP (and hence, a softer approach in the integra-
tion dimension).
3.2.4. Energy Efficiency Regulation
As in the previous example, the directive on energy effi-
ciency started out with a clear discrepancy of positions
concerning the stringency of action (regulation dimen-
sion): here, positions ranged from the target value ad-
vocated by the EP as advocated in several resolutions,
namely an increase in energy efficiency of 40 % to be
reached until 2030 in comparison to a target of 27% tar-
get initially adopted by the Council. A second main is-
sue, however, concerned the authority of supranational
regulation towards the Member States (integration di-
mension), with the EP calling for setting individual na-
tional targets, and the European Council excluding such
targets in favor of indicative national contributions. In
addition, the question was raised how to set and oper-
ationalize annual savings obligations for Member States.
In legislative negotiations with the Council, the EP there-
fore addressed issues in several dimensions, concerning
the overall stringency of regulation, its form of imple-
mentation and scope concerning its extension to sectors
such as private buildings, transport, and industrial activ-
ity (cp. EPRS, 2019b). The agreement reached with the
Council represents a compromise with the EP’s initial po-
sition, setting the EU headline target at the relatively am-
bitious level of 32.5% but using (non-binding) indicative
national contributions and lower annual savings obliga-
tions than sought by the EP (0.8% per year for the pe-
riod through 2030). With regard to its scope, the new
directive combines an extension of sectors with a right
of Member States to exclude especially sensitive sectors
such as transport (intergovernmental dimension). As in
other examples, the EP pushed for more stringency in
the overall ambition of EU climate policy, but eventually
agreed to only moderate advances in combination with
flexibility mechanisms aimed at the accommodation of
Member State interests, and only moderate advances to-
wards more EU authority in implementation.
4. Conclusion: Is the EP Resistant to the Politicization
of Climate Change Policy?
In summation, this article demonstrates how full legisla-
tive involvement of the EP in decision-making about a
potentially politicized aspect of global governance works
less as a triggering, but more as a constraining factor for
partisan polarization of parliamentary decision-making:
overall, EP decision-making on legislation passed to re-
vise and advance the policy framework of EU climate ac-
tion is negotiated effectively and often informally with
the Council, is based on broad majorities both at com-
mittee and plenary level, and results in policy-making de-
cisions that carefully balance moderate advances in one
issue dimension with compensation and flexibility mech-
anisms in another. While this is not to deny the signif-
icant and often very conflictual content of agreements,
party group polarization as a first indicator of politiciza-
tion emerges only to a limited extent (confirming H1). DI
offers plausible theoretical arguments to explain this rel-
ative restraint: incentives for MEPs to seek policy modifi-
cations at the level of CRD in most cases outweigh the in-
centive to establish more polarizing claims aimed at the
wider public at the level of CMD. In this sense, the gov-
ernance of EU climate action is largely policy-oriented,
technical and relatively immune to more fundamental
disputes about the severity of climate change or princi-
ples of its mitigation.
Nevertheless, a comparison of EP decision-making
on the internal and external dimension of EU climate pol-
icy reveals variation in the extent of party polarization
that equally fits a DI explanation: In the external dimen-
sion, EP activity is mostly confined to declaratory, non-
binding resolutions that are relatively stringent and po-
larizing in their content and based on less internal nego-
tiation and coordination in the EP than legislative acts.
EP resolutions at this level are relatively ambitious but
do not create strong incentives for intensive partisan
contestation or polarization (in this sense, contradicting
H2). Within the internal dimension, the EP operates as
a highly specialized legislator that uses a sophisticated
set of arrangements to conduct amostly technical legisla-
tive bargaining, both between EP party groups and with
the Council. Policy coordination at this level is highly spe-
cialized and involves substantial political conflict in dif-
ferent issue dimensions, but succeeds in accommodating
positions within these dimensions through negotiations
that are largely detached from public communication or
scrutiny. Taken together, the findings confirm H3, posit-
ing that political conflict on climate governance is inter-
nalized within the EP rather than projected to external
audiences or institutions.
In the bigger picture, and compared to other legis-
latures, the relative immunity of the EP against broader
politicization appears towork in favor of a relatively strin-
gent and progressive development of climate change pol-
icy in the EU compared to other political entities, partic-
ularly the US (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010; Skjaerseth,
Bang, & Schreurs, 2013). Future research should engage
in more comparative studies to investigate the interrela-
tions between the politics and policy of climate change:
more specifically, how different issue dimensions and
policy-making frames are brought together to build the
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coalitions needed to pass climate legislation through the
EP, and how resulting findings can be set in comparison
with other legislatures on the national level, both within
and beyond Europe.
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